Introduction
It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to talk to you tonight. The topic of my talk is fitting not only given current global events, but also because it was a topic of great importance to Baldy
Harper. The opening lines of his wonderful 1951 article, "In Search of Peace," read as follows:
Charges of pacifism are likely to be hurled at anyone who in these troubled times raises any question about the race into war. If pacifism means embracing the objective of peace, I am willing to accept the charge. If it means opposing all aggression against others, I am willing to accept that charge also. It is now urgent in the interest of liberty that many persons become "peacemongers." among classical liberals and libertarians 2 , let alone among members of the two mainstream political parties. Indeed, any pushback against the current "race into war" against supposed foreign threats is met with the exact type of criticism noted by Harper over six decades ago. In FY 2014 the U.S. government spent $496 billion on the base defense budget used to fund the core operations of the Department of Defense. In addition to this base budget, an additional $91.9 billion was allocated to Overseas Contingency Operations to fund the war in Afghanistan. 4 The government spent another $164.9 billion for defense-related agencies and functions including: Veteran's Affairs ($63.4 billion), The State Department ($42.7 billion), Homeland Security ($39.3 billion), the FBI which is housed in the Department of Justice ($8.3 billion), and the National Nuclear Security Administration which is housed in the Department of conflicts, taken together, will be the most expensive wars in US history -totaling somewhere between $4 to $6 trillion. This includes long-term medical care and disability compensation for service members, veterans and families, military replenishment and social and economic costs."
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She goes on to note that the most significant portion of this bill has not yet been paid since it entails, among other things, servicing the debt and future medical costs. There can be no doubt that this will negatively affect the fiscal situation of the United States for decades to come.
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Note also that this does not include the current, and future, operations in Iraq to combat ISIS and future insurgent groups which will surely emerge. can rely on competitive market prices and profit and loss to gauge the opportunity costs of alternative courses of action. In political settings, in contrast, the ability to rely on economic calculation is absent. Political decision makers can increase military-related outputs by investing more money in certain lines of production, but there is no mechanism to inform them if they are allocating scarce resources to their highest-valued uses. In other words, there is no way for policymakers to know if they are providing the right quantities and qualities of military outputs.
Moreover, given the incentives in politics, which I will discuss in a moment, there is a tendency for overreach and overproduction. and on the left of the political spectrum often claim to be against corporate welfare. Yet when it comes to the military, they somehow pretend that these issues are irrelevant or unimportant.
Given the size and reach of the military sector, this is a major mistake given the deleterious effects of these factors on a market economy.
Foreign military intervention is severely limited in what it can achieve
One might argue that the significant amount of resources spent on the military, including the waste, is worth it if military activities can yield significant benefits through foreign interventions. The problem with the unconstrained vision is that it overlooks the realities facing political decision makers. One set of constraints are knowledge constraints, or limits on human reason, which has two, related, implications. First, we cannot fully grasp the complexities of the world in our own society, let alone in other societies. Second, we don't know how to go about designing a liberal society from scratch even under the best-case scenario. Policymakers typically attempt to circumvent these implications either by ignoring them or by attempting to mimic activities and outcomes in their own country-e.g., holding elections-so they can pretend they are spreading freedom and liberty by producing an observable output.
Those who hold the unconstrained vision seem to be completely unaware that it is the limits on their own reason that contribute to continued failures in foreign interventions. In the face of this total lack of self-awareness, they confidently promise citizens that "this time will be different." Never do they consider that they lack the means to accomplish the desired ends.
Moreover, objections which attempt to highlight potential constraints are dismissed as being "unpatriotic" and "un-American".
Because foreign interventions are necessarily simplistic relative to the complex system they seek to shape, negative consequences are unavoidable. 19 Due to the incentives they face, policymakers continually neglect the potential long-term unseen consequences and, instead, focus narrowly on the short-term visible aspects of foreign interventions. They overlook the crucial question -and then what? They simplify the problem situation in a black and white manner-"good" and "bad"-and set out to destroy those in the bad category without asking what happens even if they are successful.
These dynamics were evident in Libya where the enforcement of the no-fly zone was initially considered a major victory for the Obama administration and limited interventions more generally. This premature victory neglected the subsequent power vacuum and civil war that emerged which has imposed significant costs on both citizens of Libya and the broader region. of respondents "approved" while 34% "disapproved". Policy is not designed in a vacuum. Just because policymakers know what they want to achieve abroad doesn't mean that they know how to go about doing it. Further, policies are implemented through a political process that entails bureaucratic inertia, vested interests who seek to influence policy for their own narrow gains, and rationally ignorant voters who often demand policies that are at odds with the grand visions of "experts." You are all familiar with these same exact issues with a plethora of domestic policies, such as education, health care, and many other areas of domestic life. I ask you: why do you expect it to be any different with foreign policy which is just as, if not more, complex?
4. Foreign interventions expand the scope of domestic state power I have already discussed how foreign interventions contribute to increases in the fiscal scale of the state. But that is not all that they do. They also contribute to expansions in the scope of state Driving this expansion in the scope of state power is the fact that foreign interventions contribute to movement toward a centralized managerial state. Centralizing tendencies are a logical outcome of foreign interventions precisely because the federal government, and its agencies, are responsible for designing, implementing, and overseeing foreign operations. As the federal government increases its power, the political periphery loses power, which weakens the checks created by individual autonomy and dispersed political decision-making. Perhaps the most eloquent characterization of this process was provided by Randolph Bourne who noted that:
The State is the organization of the herd to act offensively or defensively against another herd similarly organized. The more terrifying the occasion for defense, the closer will become the organization and the more coercive the influence upon each member of the herd. War sends the current of purpose and activity flowing down to the lowest level of the herd, and to its most remote branches. All the activities of society are linked together as fast as possible to this central purpose…and the State becomes what in peacetimes it has vainly struggled to become-the inexorable arbiter and determinant of men's business and attitudes and opinions. 24 This result of the dynamics identified by Bourne has been evident during times of war throughout U.S. history. 25 Since 9/11, debates have been raging regarding the extent of the government's surveillance state and, most recently, the militarization of domestic policing. Often overlooked in these discussions is that these phenomena have deep-seeded histories in earlier U.S. foreign interventions. 26 Many argue that the tradeoff between liberty and security is necessary and assure us that it will be short lived. 27 According to this view, the government benevolently increases security during times of crisis and returns to its previous path either on its own accord or through judicial review. However, there is reason to believe that this will not be the case, as the incentives facing politicians during times of war are to overreach and to target those minority groups that have the least protection. It is not that expansions in government power cannot be undone. However, expansions are likely to be sticky and last for long periods of time due to a variety of factors including: vested interests, bureaucratic inertia, and changes in ideology whereby expansions in the scope of government power become normalized in the lives of average citizens.
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Proponents of foreign interventions assume that foreign interventions will strengthen the domestic polity by providing security and protection to citizens. It is crucial to remember that interventions abroad can, and do, undermine the freedoms and liberties of citizens at home.
Quantifying the costs of lost liberties and freedoms is extremely difficult, but this is ever the more reason to be cognizant of this overlooked cost of foreign interventions. Once liberties are lost, they are often difficult, if not impossible, to regain. Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few. In war, too, the discretionary power of the Executive is extended; its influence in dealing out offices, honors, and emoluments is multiplied; and all the means of seducing the minds, are added to those of subduing the force, of the people … No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.
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My position is often characterized as being naïvely isolationist. This criticism suggests that I, and others who hold a similar position, are content to sit by the sidelines as the world crumbles around us. If "isolationist" implies that I prefer that the U.S. government not intervene in international affairs where there is a lack of clear evidence that it can achieve the desired end, then I am guilty as charged. I do, however, reject the charge that a deep suspicion of foreign interventions implies naivety regarding global affairs and the realities of the world.
I am fully cognizant of the fact that, as far as policy issues go, foreign policy is particularly messy and difficult. The consequences of military action are far reaching and affect the target country, neighboring countries, and the country carrying out the intervention. Our understanding of the specific manifestations of these consequences is often limited ex ante.
Further, each and every occasion is highly unique, so there is no bright-line rule of when to intervene or to refrain from doing so. Given the complexities of the world, social scientists are unable to make specific point predictions about what will happen with particular foreign interventions. Instead, we are limited to making broad pattern predictions given the particular institutional arrangements and constraints involved.
Precisely because of the sheer complexities involved, I am predisposed against foreign military interventions. Just as the work of Ludwig von Mises, F.A. Hayek, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and others leads me to be skeptical about the ability of government to achieve grandiose initiatives domestically, so too am I skeptical that government can do so internationally where the complexities are often far greater. I do not deny that government can succeed or generate benefits abroad in specific instances, just like it can at home. However, for the reasons discussed above, I lack confidence that foreign interventions can generate net benefits systematically across cases of foreign intervention.
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Where does this leave us? Let me suggest that a good starting point is to discuss the specifics of defense in a free society. As I mentioned at the outset, this topic is unsettled and controversial even among classical liberals and libertarians. From there we can move on to discussing whether the state is actually able to deliver on the desired end in a manner that maintains, rather than undermines, a free and prosperous society.
In closing, let me say that I realize that it is important to be aware of potential external threats to our liberties and freedoms. At the same time, it is crucial that we never forget that there is a significant internal threat to those same liberties and freedoms that we must battle on a daily basis-the State.
